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Abstract
Ubiquitous empirical evidence suggests that economic agents 
strive towards but often fail to maximize utility. Yet there is no 
consensus  on  how  to  best  model  deviations  from  optimal 
behaviour. This paper reviews and analyses the foundation of 
the utility  maximization model and proposes a more general 
framework  that is  consistent  with  –  but  also  allows  for 
deviations  from  –  utility  maximization.  The  framework 
assumes a complete, reflexive, transitive and continuous binary 
preference  relation,  guaranteeing  the  existence  of  a  utility 
function. This approach provides a clear theoretical perspective 
on  behaviour  that  appears  to  be  inconsistent  with  utility 
maximization.  When  applied  to  a  standard  supply-demand 
schedule, the framework implies that market clearing quantities 
are inefficiently low, even when agents make optimal decisions 
on average but deviate from optimal decisions in general.
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1. Introduction
Consumers spend more money when given five $1 bills than when given one $5 bill (Mishra et al 
2006 and Raghubir & Srivastava 2009). People who are given a mug are willing to sell it only if 
they get twice as much as they would have paid for it, had it not been given to them (Kahneman et  
al  1991).  Morning  sunshine  predicts  increased  stock  returns  (Hirshleifer  &  Shumway  2003). 
Evidence of bad choices on markets is mounting.
Still, the idea that people are perfect utility maximizers prevails in economics, for good reasons. A 
vast  body  of  mainstream  economic  theory  is  based  on  the  crucial  assumption  that  agents 
consistently maximize a stable utility function representing their preferences. This paper reviews 
the  utility  maximization  model  (section  2.1)  and  addresses  the  merits  and  weaknesses  of  the 
assumptions on which it relies, i.e. reflexivity, completeness (section 2.2), transitivity (section 2.3) 
and continuity (section 2.4) of preferences.
A theoretical discussion about how the utility maximization model can be rejected is complemented 
by empirical  evidence  suggesting  that  utility  indeed is  not  maximized in  general  (section 2.5). 
Empirical evidence also suggests that what appears to be deviations from optimal behaviour cannot 
be fully explained by measurement errors (section 3.1). This view seems to be shared by economists 
of all schools, but the extent to which deviations from utility maximization should be in focus is 
controversial.
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  investigate  how  the  utility  maximization  model  may  fail,  by 
reviewing both logical arguments and empirical evidence for and against the axioms that constitute 
the foundation of the utility maximization model. Some of the models that have been suggested as 
alternatives or variations of the utility maximizing model are discussed. There is plenty of interest 
in  modelling  the  failure  to  maximize  utility,  but  existing  models  do  not  serve  as  a  common 
foundation for both perfect and flawed decision making (section 3.2).
Another purpose is to propose a general, realistic, useful and mathematically clear framework that is 
consistent  with  both  the  utility  maximization  model  and  the  commonly  observed  failure  to 
maximize utility. The suggested framework assigns a probability of choice to every bundle in a 
budget set, and allows researchers to choose what cognitive biases to include or exclude in their 
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model (section 3.3). By itself, it fails to explain how the effect of any particular cognitive bias on 
choice is quantified or estimated. Finally, the paper aims to illustrate the implications of deviations 
from optimality in the demand-supply schedule of standard microeconomics.
Using fairly simple mathematics, the lessons of the framework is applied to the standard supply-
demand schedule, leading to the conclusion that deviations from optimality leads to inhibition of 
trade (section 3.4). Sub-optimal consumers can only demand too low quantities because of their 
budget constraints. Even when both consumers and firms deviate from optimal decisions in general 
but make optimal decisions on average, inefficiently low trade ensues. This effect is especially large 
on small markets, but exists also on large markets.
Finally,  a  few  simulations  are  conducted  to  demonstrate  how  stochastic  supply,  demand  and 
resulting trade volume can be illustrated as probability density functions (section 3.5). It is made 
clear from the illustrations that the distribution of market clearing quantity differs significantly from 
the distributions of demand and supply. Thus, the suggested framework is useful beyond it outlining 
a clear mathematical representation and a general perspective on flawed decision making.
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2. Utility Maximization
2.1. Review of the Utility Maximization Model
The  following  notation  and  reasoning  is  largely  based  on  Mas-Collel  (1995).  Let  X  be  a 
consumption set where all elements are mutually exclusive bundles that at least in principle are 
consumable. Let ≿  be a preference relation defined on X , such that x≿ y  means that an agent 
prefers  x  to  y  or  is  indifferent  between  the  two.  Then  let  x≻ y  represent  the  relation 
x≿ y ∧ ¬( y≿x)  and  x ~ y  represent the relation  x≿ y∧ y≿x .  Jaffray (1975) proves that the 
completeness,  reflexivity,  transitivity  and  continuity  of  ≿  are  sufficient  conditions  for  the 
existence of a continuous utility function u : X→ℝ  representing ≿ , so that x≿ y ⇔ u(x )≥u( y )
∀ x , y∈X .  The  proof  is  lengthy  and complicated  and  will  therefore  not  be  reproduced  here. 
Completeness, reflexivity, transitivity and continuity of preferences are defined as
x ≿ y ∨ y ≿ x  ∀ x , y∈X (Completeness)
x≿x  ∀ x∈X (Reflexivity)
x ≿ y ∧ y ≿ z ⇒ x ≿ z  ∀ x , y , z∈X (Transitivity)
 {x∈X : x≿ y }  and {x∈X : y≿x }  are closed sets ∀ x , y∈X . (Continuity)
The self-interest of an agent implies that she chooses to consume a bundle that she prefers to all 
other feasible bundles. Formally, the individual chooses to consume an arbitrary bundle in the set 
C(≿ , B)={x∈B : x≿ y ∀ y∈B} ,  where  C(⋅)  is  referred to as a choice rule and  B⊆X  is  a 
budget set consisting of all the bundles that are feasible to the agent. That is, C(⋅)  is a procedure 
that the agent uses to generate a set of most preferred bundles  C(≿ , B)  from given preferences 
≿  and a budget set B .
Seeing that the agent is indifferent between all the bundles in C(≿, B) , it is reasonable to assume 
that the agent randomizes between the bundles in C(≿, B) . That is, whenever C(≿ ,B)  contains 
several bundles, the agent can reasonably choose an arbitrary bundle in C(≿ ,B) . Symbolically, if 
p(x)  is  the  probability  of  the  agent  choosing  bundle  x ,  then  p(x)>0  ∀ x∈C(≿, B)  and 
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p(x)=0  ∀ x∉C(≿, B) . A slightly stronger version of this argument is that the agent is equally 
likely  to  choose  any  bundle  in  C(≿ ,B) ,  again  because  the  agent  by  definition  is  indifferent 
between all  bundles in this set.  Symbolically,  if  ∣C (≿,B)∣  is  the cardinality of  C(≿ ,B) ,  the 
prediction is that  p(x)=1/∣C (≿, B)∣  ∀ x∈C(≿, B)  and p(x)=0 ∀ x∉C(≿, B) .
This abstraction does little more than to ensure a clear understanding of the theory for when the 
reader has reason to doubt the existence of a utility function. If a utility function indeed exists, the  
maximization of utility gives the same set while being mathematically more convenient.  The utility 
maximization  problem  is  max x u  subject  to  x∈B ,  and  like  C(≿ ,B) ,  the  set 
{x∈B :u (x)≥u ( y ) ∀ y∈B}  contains all feasible bundles preferable to all other feasible bundles. 
If B  is a compact set, the extreme value theorem implies that ∃x∈B : u(x )≥ u ( y) ∀ y ∈ B  and 
that C(≿ ,B)≠∅ . The theory presented so far is the underlying core of most economics, and will 
hence forth be referred to as the utility maximization model. 
As will be explained in further detail, ubiquitous empirical evidence suggests that people often fail 
to act in ways that are consistent with the utility maximization model. The inconsistency indicates 
that  at  least  one  assumption  in  the  model  is  wrong.  First,  the  assumptions  of  completeness, 
reflexivity, transitivity and continuity are discussed in an effort to investigate the extent to which 
relaxations of these assumptions can explain behaviour inconsistent with the utility maximization 
model.
2.2. Completeness and Reflexivity
Suppose  that  the  completeness  assumption  is  relaxed  and  that  ¬(x≿ y) ∧ ¬( y≿x )  for  some 
x , y∈X .  If  an  agent  then  is  forced  to  choose  between  x  and  y ,  the  agent  can  arbitrarily 
randomize  between  x  and  y  and  has  no  reason  to  deviate  from such  a  strategy.  The  same 
reasoning is equally valid for when preferences are complete and x≿ y ∧ y≿x  for some x , y∈X . 
Seeing that an indifference relation and a lack of preference relation results in identical behaviour, 
there seems to be no way of empirically testing whether an agent is indifferent between two bundles 
or if the two bundles are incomparable.
Aumann (1962), Bewley (2002), Eliaz & Ok (2006) and Mandler (2009) reject this view and offer 
6
models  that  differentiate  between  ¬(x≿ y) ∧ ¬( y≿x )  and  x≿ y ∧ y≿x .  They  deduce  their 
models from assumptions made about the nature of preferences and comparison. These assumptions 
vary between authors and each relies on a different psychological interpretation of incompleteness. 
The proposition ¬(x≿ y) ∧ ¬( y≿x )  is described as “indecisiveness” by Eliaz and Ok (2006) and 
as  “unranked”  by  Mandler  (2008).  A deeper  psychological  and  philosophical  account  of  the 
foundation  of  incompleteness  is  offered  by  Raz  (1986)  and  Chang  (2002)  who  use  the  terms 
“incommensurability” and “indeterminacy” respectively to describe incomplete preferences. Danan 
and Ziegelmeyer (2006) conduct an experiment concluding that preferences are incomplete because 
agents are willing to pay a small cost to postpone decisions.
If  preferences  indeed  are  incomplete,  it  remains  unclear  how  ¬(x≿ y) ∧ ¬( y≿x )  should  be 
interpreted and how such lack of a preference relation can be measured. For example, in Danan and 
Ziegelmeyer's (2006) experiment, an agent may want to postpone a choice between x  and y  when 
x≿ y ∨ y≿x  because  the  agent  expects  his  ability  to  make  a  decision  consistent  with  his 
preferences to improve over time. Critics of the completeness axiom often point out the difficulty of 
agents to make comparisons between bundles that are either drastically different or very similar, but 
such difficulty  is  irrelevant if  the comparison is  made unconsciously. This ambiguity about the 
manifestation of incomplete preferences is likely the main reason that empirical evidence asserting 
violations of completeness is sparse and weak.
Nevertheless, there are situations in which completeness might be violated. For example, suppose 
that an agent has preferences such that car x  is preferred to car y  if and only if car x  is both safer 
and faster and vice versa. Then, if car x  is safer but slower than car y , neither x≿ y  nor y≿x  is 
true. Alternatively, consider the more extreme case of a parent forced to choose between the death 
of  either  of  her  two children  x  and  y .  One  can  easily  imagine  that  both  alternative  are  so 
devastating to the parent that a comparison is not applicable. Now suppose that child  x  but not 
child y  has life insurance. A parent that is indifferent between the death of child x  and child y  
should then prefer the death of child x  coupled with the insurance money to the death of child y  
without money. However, one can easily imagine that the difference in money fails to make the 
comparison any easier, which may indicate that x  and y  cannot be compared.
In  any  case,  even  if  completeness  is  violated,  Peleg  (1970)  proves  that  completeness  is  not 
necessary  for  the  existence  of  a  utility  function  representing  preferences.  In  other  words, 
7
x≿ y ⇒ u(x )≥u( y)  ∀ x , y∈X  still  holds  without  completeness,  but  u(x )≥u( y ) ⇒ x≿ y  
∀ x , y∈X  is  no longer true.  Utility maximization can still  be performed, but with a  different 
interpretation. With completeness, a utility maximizing bundle is preferred to all other bundles, but 
without  completeness,  no bundles  are  strictly  preferred to  the utility  maximizing bundle.  Thus, 
whether preferences are complete or not is a minor concern for the purposes of this text because the 
utility maximization model remains largely intact even without completeness.
Reflexivity is sometimes claimed to follow directly from completeness (e.g. Mas-Colell 1995:6). 
While it is true that x ≿ y ∨ y ≿ x  ∀ x , y∈X  implies x≿x  if x  is allowed to be equal to y , 
the  normal  interpretation  of  the  completeness  assumption  is  that  cases  with  x= y  are  not 
considered,  meaning that  completeness does  not  imply reflexivity.  For  example,  the commonly 
known binary relation  >  defined on any subset of  ℝ  is complete because  x> y ∨ y> x  for all 
distinct x  and y  in that subset, but irreflexive because x> x  is false.
Regardless of whether reflexivity follows from completeness or not, x≿x  is probably as close to 
self-evident as any claim in economics can get. Imagining an agent with preferences such that x  is 
not at least as good as itself is difficult, and if at all possible, such a scenario would deserve more 
attention in philosophy than in economics. For this reason, no further attention will be given to the 
possibility of preferences not being reflexive.
2.3. Transitivity
Fishburn  (1991)  summarizes  the  most  common  arguments  for  transitive  preferences  and  then 
demonstrates  that  all  of  them are  questionable  reasons  for  assuming  transitivity.  Consider  for 
example the money pump argument, where we assume that x≻ y , y≻z  and z≻x . An agent with 
such preferences would reasonably be willing to pay something to obtain y  in place of z  because 
y≻z . Having made such a trade, the agent would also be willing to pay something to obtain x  in 
place of  y  because  x≻ y . Lastly, the agent would be willing to pay something to obtain  z  in 
place of x  because z≻x . However, trading in this manner, the agent pays to end up with the same 
bundle that she started with, which seems silly.
Fishburn agrees that it would be silly for an agent to lose money going through such a sequential  
cycle of pairwise decisions, but argues that the reasonable agent will only do so if she is deceived. 
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Fishburn goes on to suggest that the agent may use some choice rule other than choosing the most  
preferred bundle in pairwise sequential comparisons. For example, Quirk & Saposnik (1968:15) 
suggest that the agent randomizes between bundles when preferences are intransitive. Alternatively, 
one can easily imagine a choice rule where the initially endowed bundle is kept whenever it is an 
element in a set with intransitive preferences. Thus, the money pump argument is not as convincing 
as it first appears.
Intransitive preferences are logically possible if and only if there are at least three bundles in X , 
defined on at  least  two dimensions (Navarick & Fantino 1974, Ng 1977).  This makes decision 
theory with violations of the transitivity assumption intrinsically complicated. In order to see how 
intransitive preferences may arise, consider as an example the budget set  {x , y , z} , where each 
element represents a car defined on three dimensions with the characteristics seen in the following 
table.
 Speed Safety Comfort
Car x Medium Good Poor
Car y Poor Medium Good
Car z Good Poor Medium
Table 1:  If one car is strictly preferred to another if and only if  
it  is  better  than  the  other  car  in  two  or  more  dimensions,  
preferences are intransitive.
The agent's preferences are such that one car is strictly preferred to another if and only if it is better  
than the other car in two or more dimensions. From the table above, pairwise comparisons of cars  
then make it clear that x≻ y , y≻z  and z≻x , implying that preferences are not transitive. In this 
example,  dimensions are aspects of a single kind of good, but the dimensions may also be the 
quantities in a bundle of several commodities.
Numerous  researchers  have  elicited  what  appears  to  be  intransitive  preferences  in  humans and 
animals  by  devising  experiments  where  options  explicitly  or  implicitly  are  defined  in  several 
dimensions (May 1954, Tversky 1969, Navarick & Fantino 1972, Loomes et al 1991, Sharif 1994, 
Roelofsma & Read 2000, Waite 2001, Lee et al 2009).  Intransitive preferences may be pervasive 
also outside of the laboratory. Tversky (1969) gives an example of a car buyer who finds each add-
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on feature worth the slightly higher price, but then ends up preferring the original car with no add-
on features to a more expensive car with many add-on features. Roelofsma & Read (2000) and 
Andreou (2007) propose that procrastination may be due to intertemporal intransitivity. Nooteboom 
(1984) argues that intransitive preferences are likely to be common in the retail industry because 
choices are made based on a wide range of dimensions such as proximity, cheapness and service 
attraction. 
Despite  abundant  evidence  against  transitive  preferences,  the  transitivity  assumption  prevails 
mainly for two reasons.  First,  the existent empirical evidence is  sometimes criticized for being 
flawed or  insufficient.  For  example,  Regenwetter  et  al  (2011) review 20 studies  of  intransitive 
preferences  and  conclude  that  most  of  the  data  is  consistent  with  transitive  preferences  when 
considering the stochastic nature of the choices. Birnbaum & Schmidt (2008) find that intransitive 
patterns disappear in experiments when options are clarified and decisions are repeated, suggesting 
that the alleged evidence against transitivity is weak or has limited applicability in a real market 
outside of the laboratory.
The second and probably most important reason for relying on the transitivity assumption in spite of 
evidence against it, is that the disposing of the transitivity assumption would cause economics as we 
currently know it to completely collapse. Transitivity is a necessary condition for the existence of a 
utility  function,  and  many  economic  models  would  be  nonsensical  without  it.  Thus,  potential 
violations  of  the  transitivity  assumption  is  a  major  concern  in  the  construction  of  the  utility 
maximization model and for economics at large.
2.4. Continuity
It is intuitively best understood as the absence of jumps in preferences. To be clear however, a 
binary relation on a discrete set often is continuous. For example, if X  is cars consumable only in 
non-negative integer amounts so that X={0,1,2,. ..} , then ≿  is continuous because all subsets of 
{0,1,2,...}  are closed.
Continuity  is  assumed  because  completeness,  reflexivity  and  transitivity  are  not  sufficient 
conditions for the existence of a utility function, but with the addition of a continuity assumption, a 
continuous utility function is guaranteed to exist. Continuity is not a necessary condition for the 
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existence  of  a  utility  function  and is  not  as  crucial  as  the  other  assumptions.  For  example,  if 
X=[0,1]  and x ~ y≻0 ∀ x , y∈(0,1 ] , then ≿  is not continuous because {x∈X : y≿x }  is not a 
closed set . Still, any utility function u : X→ℝ  with u(x )= u ( y) > u(0)  ∀ x , y∈( 0,1]  represents 
such preferences. In fact, if ≿  is complete, reflexive and transitive, then any finite consumption set 
X  can be represented by a utility function (Mas-Colell 1995:9).
Empirical  evidence  suggests  that  preferences  often  are  discontinuous  where  price  is  zero. 
Shampanier et al (2007) show experimentally that people prefer a free good to a very low priced 
good so much and in such combinations  that  it  suggests  that  preferences  are  discontinuous.  In 
general, the zero price level seems to be qualitatively different from all other prices in the human 
mind. For example, Festinger & Carlsmith (1959) find that a given task tends to be more likeable 
when the agent performing it is not paid to do it. Gneezy & Rustichini (2000) find that performance 
is higher in a given task when the level of compensation is zero as opposed to a small amount. 
However,  Seabright  (2009)  argues  that  what  appears  to  be  discontinuous  preferences  can  be 
explained by agents signalling altruism, civic duty or some other  trait  to themselves or others. 
Following  this  line  of  thought,  the  fore-mentioned  experimental  results  are  consistent  with 
continuous preferences. Thus, it is still unclear in what circumstances, if at all, preferences are truly 
discontinuous at zero price.
An  important  reason  for  assuming  continuous  preferences  is  that  it  rules  out  lexicographic 
preferences, which is a non-continuous preference relation making the existence of a utility function 
impossible (Mas-Colell 1995:46). Lexicographic preferences occur when bundles are compared in 
terms of two or more aspects and one aspect completely dominates another. For example, an agent 
that always prefers the bundle with more of biological diversity and only begins to consider money 
when comparing two bundles with the same biological diversity,  has lexicographic preferences. 
This example illustrates that a refusal to trade one good for another regardless of the price indicates 
lexicographic  preferences.  Such  preferences  seem  implausible  when  the  commodity  is  some 
commonly traded consumer good, but can make more sense when the commodity is something 
more abstract and crucial.
Hanemann (1991) shows theoretically that the willingness to accept compensation for forgoing a 
good can approach infinity given that the good has no substitutes. As an extreme example, if an 
agent is offered money to end his own life, there may very well be no amount of compensation at 
which the agent wants to forgo his life, indicating lexicographic preferences. Spash (2000) suggests 
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that some people might have lexicographic preferences for public environmental goods for ethical 
reasons, referring to multiple surveys such as Stevens et al (1991), Spash and Hanley (1995) and 
Lockwood (1998) where refusals to  bid any amount to accept  environmental  damage might  be 
interpreted as environmental value dominating monetary value.
Thus, theory and empirical evidence suggest that lexicographic preferences may be present in some 
people  in  very  specific  and  unusual  circumstances.  Rosenberger  et  al  (2003)  discuss,  without 
reaching a conclusive answer, the possibility that such results indicate little more than the surveys' 
failure  to  elicit  extreme  responses  when  preferences  are  extreme.  In  many  cases  a  plausible 
explanation for what seems to be lexicographic preferences is that people value some aspects of a 
bundle much higher than other aspects, but without the former aspect completely dominating the 
latter.  Consider  for  example,  a  person being  offered  $ 1099  as  compensation  for  allowing  the 
extinction of a particular species of bird. It is reasonable to doubt that the person's hypothetical 
refusal to accept the compensation would stand if  such an extravagant offer would materialize. 
Indeed, if there is any finite amount that the agent would accept as compensation, preferences are 
not lexicographic and a utility function might exist. In conclusion, the possibility of lexicographic 
preferences or otherwise discontinuous preferences does not seem to hinder the existence of a utility 
function in most economic problems.
2.5. Testing the Utility Maximization Model
This section demonstrates how the utility maximization model, as presented in section 2.1. can be 
tested and potentially rejected. The model predicts that budget set  B  and preferences  ≿  cause 
p(x)=1/∣C (≿ , B)∣  ∀ x∈C(≿, B)  and  p(x)=0  ∀ x∉C(≿ ,B) .  That is,  ≿  and  B  alone 
explains  p(x) .  The standard approach in  economics is  to say that  p(x)  reveals  ≿ ,  but this 
makes  testing  the  utility  maximization  model  impossible  because  it  entails  circular  reasoning. 
Assuming that preferences ≿  are revealed by choice p(x)  necessarily leads to the conclusion that 
preferences and choice are perfectly correlated, which had already been assumed. Going beyond 
revealed preference is therefore necessary when testing the utility maximization model.
Any experiment with the ambition to test the model must have a control group and at least one 
treatment group. Suppose for simplicity that only one treatment group is used and that ≿1 , B1  and 
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p1(x)   represent the preferences, budget set and outcome of the control group. Then let ≿2 , B2  
and  p2(x)   represent the preferences, budget set and outcome of the treatment group. A natural 
starting point is to consider varying preferences or the budget set so that inferences can be drawn 
from differences in outcomes.
First consider varying preferences to see what effect it has on choice. Imagine an experiment in 
which  subjects  in  a  treatment  group are  exposed to  some stimulus  that  a  control  group is  not 
exposed to, and that this affects preferences so that ≿1 ≠≿2  and B1=B2 . Without a specification 
of preferences, the utility maximization model then offers no predictions on the expected difference 
between p1(x)  and p2(x) . It is unclear what stimulus could be used and how that stimulus should 
be  expected  to  affect  preferences.  Whether  the  experiment  indicates  p1(x)=p2(x )  or 
p1(x)≠p2(x) , the utility maximization model cannot be rejected.
Using this approach, the difference between ≿1  and ≿2  must somehow be estimated in order to 
make any prediction on the difference between  p1(x)  and  p2(x) ,  and to make the prediction 
meaningful,   p1(x)  and  p2(x)  cannot be used to estimate  ≿1  and  ≿2 .   Such estimation is 
difficult because preferences are hidden deeply in the psyche of the agent. Possible measures for 
estimating  preferences  include  heart  rate,  blood  pressure,  skin  conductance,  pupil  dilation,  eye 
movements, muscle activity, dopamine levels, cortisol levels, brain waves (EEG), blood flow in the 
brain (fMRI) and self-reported perceptions.
Edgeworth  (1881)  suggested  that  technological  advances  would  enable  the  mechanical 
measurement  of  preferences  using  psychophysical  indicators,  but  the  idea  never  gained  much 
popularity. Fisher (1893) argued that preferences are better measured through their choices, and 
after  Samuelson's  (1938)  ground  breaking  formalization  of  revealed  preference,  the  consensus 
became that choice reveals preference and that any other estimate of preferences is inferior and 
irrelevant in economics. The psychophysical measurement of preferences is regaining some interest 
in the 21st century due to advances in brain scanning technology (Camerer et al 2005), but the 
scientific community is still far from being able to accurately estimate preferences without relying 
on choice.
Perhaps  there  is  nothing  closer  to  psychophysical  measurements  of  preferences  than  Shizgal's 
(1997) model for estimating the utility resulting from electrical brain stimulation in rats. This said, 
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economics is still lacking relevant models for estimating utility independently from choice safely in 
humans, perhaps because it can easily be argued that any estimate of preferences that is not based 
on  the  agent's  relevant  choice  is  less  valid  than  the  relevant  choice  itself.  Testing  the  utility 
maximization model by varying preferences is then bound to result in little more than debates on the 
extent to which the used measure of preferences is valid, making this approach futile. 
An alternative and more promising approach to testing the utility maximization model is to vary 
budget sets and draw inferences from choices made. In contrast to preferences, budget sets can be 
accurately estimated and readily controlled by an experimenter. Assuming that altering a budget set 
does  not  affect  preferences,  setting  up  an  experiment  where  B1≠B2  and  ≿1 ≡≿2  is  easily 
accomplished.
To determine whether the resulting choices are consistent with the utility maximization model, we 
use the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) which – contrary to what its name seems to 
suggest – logically follows from the utility maximization model (Mas-Colell 1995:12). Then, by 
modus tollens, if WARP does not hold, the utility maximization model must be rejected.
WARP says that if  x  is chosen over  y  in one budget set, then there can be no other budget set 
containing  x  and  y  in  which  y  is  always  chosen  over  x .  Formally,  if  x , y ∈ B1  and 
x ∈ C(≿ , B1) ,  then  for  any  B2  with  x , y ∈ B2  and  y ∈ C (≿ ,B2) ,  we  must  have 
x ∈ C(≿ , B2) . An experiment where  x  is chosen over  y  when the agent is facing  x , y ∈ B1 , 
but y  is chosen over x  when x , y ∈ B2  then is evidence against the utility maximization model. 
That said, such an inference is somewhat questionable because y  might have been chosen over x  
when x , y ∈ C (≿ ,B2) .
Battalio  et  al  (1973),  Simonson & Tversky (1992),  Sippel  (1997),  Harbaugh & Krause (2000), 
Harbaugh  et  al  (2001)  and  Andreoni  &  Miller  (2002)  test  WARP experimentally  with  results 
suggesting  that  choices  often  are  inconsistent  with  WARP.  In  other  words,  empirical  evidence 
indicates that the utility maximization model is flawed.
A third way of testing the utility maximization model is to hold both preferences and the budget set 
fixed while varying something that should be independent of both preferences and the budget set. 
The model can then be rejected if this something affects the dependent variable p(x)  in a way that 
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is not predicted by the model. In experimental notation, the null hypothesis in this approach is 
H 0: ≿1 ≡≿2  and B1=B2  ⇒  p1(x)=p2(x) ,
and the alternative hypothesis is
H 1: ≿1 ≡≿2  and B1=B2  ⇒  p1(x)≠p2(x) .
Devising an experiment in which preferences and budget sets are fixed, only  p1(x)  and  p2(x)  
need to be estimated. Such simplicity surely plays a big part in making this approach popular in 
bringing forth flaws of the utility maximization model. Many studies justify the rejection of the 
utility  maximization  model  on  the  grounds  of  this  approach,  and  a  few  simple  and  striking 
phenomena established in those studies will be briefly discussed here.
The  framing effect  is  evident  when subjects  facing  identical  problems make  different  choices, 
depending on how alternatives are presented in the problem. Examples of the framing effect are 
ubiquitous and well founded in empirical research. Tversky & Kahneman (1981), McNeil (1982), 
Cormier  O'Connor  et  al  (1985) and Gächter  et  al  (2009) find  that  people  make systematically 
different  choices  in  logically  equivalent  decision  problems,  depending  on  how  the  decision 
problems are worded.
Tversky & Kahneman (1981) asked 152 participants of an experiment to imagine the US preparing 
for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease expected to kill 600 people. The participants of the 
experiment then faced the choice of favouring either program A or program B. In the treatment 
group, program A was described as “400 people will die” and program B was described as “There 
is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die” . In the control 
group, program A was described as  “200 people will be saved” and program B was described as 
“There is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be  
saved”. 78% of the participants in the treatment group chose program B over program A but only 
28% of the participants in the control group chose program B over program A, as seen in illustration 
1.
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The participants favoured the risky alternative significantly more when the problem was framed in 
terms of the probability of deaths than when it was framed in terms of the probability of saved lives, 
although program A and program B are logically equivalent between the control group and the 
treatment group.
Kahneman et al (1991) propose that in general, people choose differently when gambles are framed 
as potential losses than when they are framed as potential gains because losses are emotionally 
more  severe  than  equivalent  gains,  a  tendency  known as  loss  aversion.  Tom et  al  (2007)  and 
Canessa et al (2013) find that there is a neural basis for loss aversion in risky decision problems and 
that losses are treated qualitatively different from gains in the human brain. 
Staw (1976), Arkes & Blumer (1985), Garland & Newport (1991), Heath (1995) and Soman (2001) 
find that sunk costs make a significant difference to what decisions are made. For example, Garland 
&  Newport  (1991)  find  that  the  probability  of  undergraduate  and  graduate  business  students 
investing  money  in  a  project  is  positively  correlated  with  how much money  has  already  been 
invested in that project relative to the budget of that project. Agents taking sunk costs into account 
suggest that their choice depends not only on preferences and budget, but also on the costs that 
previously have been incurred. Zeng et al (2013) find evidence for a neural basis for sunk costs 
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Illustration  1:  In  an  experiment  by  Tversky  &  Kahneman  (1981) subjects  facing  a  problem 
expressed in terms of the probability of death favoured a risky program 78% of the time. Subjects  
facing the same problem but framed in terms of the probability of survival only favoured the same  
risky program 28% of the time.
having a significant effect on investment decisions.
Tversky  &  Kahneman  (1974),  Jacowitz  &  Kahneman  (1995),  Strack  &  Mussweiler  (1997), 
Mussweiler & Englich (2005) and Epley & Gilovich (2006) find that decisions on a numerical scale 
are  significantly  affected  by  agents'  exposure  to  numbers  that  are  obviously  irrelevant  to  the 
problem at  hand.  For  example,  if  one  is  told  that  the  ancient  city-state  Babylon  had  50  000 
inhabitants and then asked to estimate how much a car is worth, one's estimate is likely to be lower 
than it would have been, had one been told that Babylon had 200 000 inhabitants, even though it is 
obvious that the population of Babylon has no relation to the value of a car. This effect is commonly 
known as the anchoring effect. Neither cognitive ability, expertise nor monetary incentives removes 
the anchoring effect, although it may reduce it (Wright and Anderson 1989, Englich et al 2005, 
Simmons et al 2010, Bergman et al 2010).
The above outline of empirical research is by no means a complete account of all evidence, but it 
clearly indicates that people often fail to maximize utility in predictable ways. Seeing that agents by 
definition  want to maximize utility,  the evidence suggests that agents at least  sometimes fail  to 
maximize utility because they are unable to maximize it.
17
3. Alternatives to Utility Maximization
3.1. Judgement Error or Measurement Error
In the last  section,  agents were deemed unable to maximize utility,  which can be explained by 
agents making mistakes. This explanation of apparent sub-optimal behaviour will from here on be 
referred to as the  judgement error explanation because it says that agents are flawed as decision 
makers. An alternative explanation is that what appears to be behaviour inconsistent with utility 
maximization actually is due to measurement errors. In the same way that a physicist is bound to 
make small errors when measuring the weight, length or volume of an object, economists plausibly 
make small errors when measuring or estimating preferences and choices.
Assuming  this  alternative  explanation,  researchers  are  unable  to  see  that  utility  is  successfully 
maximized  because  they  fail  to  sufficiently  take  all  aspects  of  preferences  into  account.  It  is 
possible that an agent genuinely strictly prefers  x  to  y  despite these bundles' so called logical 
equivalence,  because  x  is  described  in  more  pleasant  terms  than  y ,  or  because  resources 
previously  have  been  spent  trying  to  obtain  x .  Two  seemingly  identical  bundles  presented 
differently may not be identical after all. This latter explanation will from here on be referred to as 
the  measurement  error  explanation because  it  says  that  it  is  the  researcher's  measurement  of 
preferences rather than the agent's utility calculation that is flawed.
On its own, the measurement error explanation is effectively a reaffirmation of the assumption that 
x  being chosen over y  implies that x≿ y . If the measurement error explanation fully explains all 
observed anomalies, the utility maximization model may hold even when it appears that agents fail 
to  maximize utility.  Most  economic models  make this  assumption explicitly  or  implicitly,   and 
characterizes empirical observations of what appears to be deviations from utility maximization as 
measurement errors. Indeed, “preferred to” is often taken to be synonymous to “chosen over” in 
economics.
The judgement error explanation is compelling because it intuitively appears more realistic than the 
measurement error explanation on grounds of introspection and anecdotal evidence. While most 
economists would consider it likely that people are at least slightly flawed decision makers, most 
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non-economists would consider the same proposition obvious. Anyone who suspects that he or she 
ever made a mistake has reason to hold the judgement error explanation true, however minor that 
mistake might have been.
Formal  empirical  evidence  also  supports  the  judgement  error  explanation.  Sokol-Hessner  et  al 
(2012)  find  that  loss  aversion  can  be  reduced  by  using  emotion  regulation  strategies  such  as 
reframing decisions  and outcomes  in  one's  mind.  That  is,  it  seems that  agents  facing  decision 
problems constructed to misguide them (e.g. the decision problems posed by Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981) can make choices more consistent with utility maximization if they are provided with the 
appropriate mental tools.
Soman & Cheema (2001) find that the sunk cost effect diminishes with repetition. Wilson et al 
(1996) and Bergman et  al  (2010) find  that  the anchoring effect  is  moderated by expertise  and 
intelligence.  To be  sure,  this  is  not  to  say  that  the  anchoring  effect  completely  disappears  for 
experienced and intelligent  people.  Indeed,  Englisch et  al  (2006) find that highly educated and 
experienced legal professionals in  Germany are susceptible  to anchoring in giving sentences to 
criminals.  Nevertheless,  the  lessening  of  susceptibility  to  these  anomalies  suggests  that  agents 
become better at maximizing utility whenever they can, supporting the judgement error explanation.
These findings are not as easily reconciled with the measurement error explanation because there is 
little reason to believe that providing agents with intelligence or training in any way affects the 
reliability  of  measurements.  However,  it  is  possible  that  intelligence and training affect  agents' 
preferences through some more or less obscure mechanism. It is also possible that some omitted 
variable  simultaneously  affects  both  preferences  and  other  variables  such  as  intelligence.  For 
example, the level of dopamine in the human brain is intricately related not only to intrinsic rewards 
and motivation (Schultz 1998, Pessiglione 2006), but also to intelligence (Previc 1999, Nieoullon 
2002). Thus, dopamine might affect both intelligence and preferences simultaneously in such a way 
that intelligence predicts preferences and choices, without there ever being any error in judgement. 
For a detailed account of how dopamine might relate to utility and decisions in economics, see 
Caplin & Dean (2008).
Similarly, if training somehow is related to preferences, it may be that agents are consistently and 
perfectly maximizing utility even when it appears as if though they are improving their ability to 
maximize utility through training. For example, the deliberate reframing of a decision in an agent's 
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mind, as in Sokol-Hessner et al (2012), might have changed the agent's preferences rather than his 
ability to make better choices in accordance to his fixed preferences. Repeated exposure to several 
decisions similar to each other may also change the way in which one perceives the desirability of 
bundles in a budget set. For example, an experienced poker player may make decisions differently 
from a beginner poker player, not only because the experienced poker player makes better decisions 
but also because the experienced poker player's attitude towards risks and potential outcomes might 
have changed as a result of the training.
Even evidence of violations of WARP can potentially be explained within the utility maximization 
model. In some experiments choices are made at long intervals, meaning that preferences might 
change in subjects from one time to another, which would nullify the test. For example, Battalio et  
al (1973) alter the budget sets facing subjects of their experiment every week. It is then possible that 
a  subject's  preferences  change  from  one  week  to  another  in  such  a  way  that  choices  appear 
inconsistent under the assumption that preferences remain constant, even if utility is consistently 
maximized.
Sippel (1997) addresses this methodological weakness by devising a lottery where subjects have all 
the time they need to make ten consumption choices, each with a different budget set and each 
having a 1/10 probability of being realized. Observations where  x ∈ C(≿ , B1)  with  x , y ∈ B1  
and  y ∈ C (≿ ,B2)  with  x , y ∈ B2  are  then  interpreted  as  violations  of  WARP.  However,  if 
x , y ∈ C (≿ ,B2) ,  this outcome is consistent with WARP. Also, Hjertstrand & Swofford (2013) 
propose a statistical test in this line of thought that when applied to previously published data in 
effect fails to reject the utility maximization model.
The possibility that agents are perfect utility maximizers cannot be ruled out, but introspection, 
anecdotal evidence, and the formal empirical evidence presented in this text indicate that there is at 
least some truth to the judgement error explanation. While scholars differ on the significance and 
importance of the judgement error explanation and the measurement error explanation respectively, 
the validity of both approaches in economics should be uncontroversial. Agents seem to be at least 
somewhat prone to error, and even in the most exact science any measurement is prone to error.
Any set of choices that appears to contradict completeness, transitivity or continuity might be due to 
an agent  making sub-optimal choices or to  a researcher  that infers erroneous conclusions  from 
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observed behaviour. Thus, either of the two explanations is sufficient to explain all observations that 
can be interpreted as evidence for preferences not being complete, transitive or continuous. The 
most plausible story of how the anomalies described in this text arise, is reasonably a combination 
of the judgement error explanation and the measurement error explanation.
Contrary to the impression given by some behavioural economists' criticism of classical economics, 
most economists seem to agree that it  is reasonable to believe that economic agents are flawed 
utility maximizers, and that the perfect utility maximizer is an ideal that can be more or less useful 
for constructing parsimonious models.
For example, Simon (1955:104) is very critical of the classical utility maximization model when he 
says that  “there is  a  complete  lack of  evidence that,  in  actual  human choice situations  of  any  
complexity, [utility maximization] computations can be, or are in fact, performed”. To be sure, he 
then  admits  the possibility  that  the  unconscious  might  be better  at  maximizing utility  than the 
conscious. On the opposite side of the spectrum, Friedman (1953:15) assures that the traditional 
assumptions are not necessarily realistic but rather useful for their ability to predict outcomes. In 
essence, his argument is that 'the relevant question to ask about the “assumptions” of a theory is  
not whether they are descriptively “realistic,” for they never are, but whether they are sufficiently  
good approximations for the purpose in hand'. 
A modern example of a controversy on the focus of economic models is based on Kahneman et al 
(2003) who outline neurological findings suggesting that agents systematically make sub-optimal 
choices,  emphasizing  the  usefulness  of  what  is  here  called  the  judgement  error  explanation  of 
economic anomalies. Gul & Pesendorfer (2005) respond to such interest in neurology by asserting 
that  the  underlying  reasons  for  an  agent's  choice  are  irrelevant  because  choices  revealing 
preferences is a methodological stance rather than an assumption in mainstream economics.
Economists assume perfect utility maximizing agents because it is a reasonable starting point for 
explaining  and  predicting  economic  behaviour,  and  because  it  allows  for  the  construction  of 
parsimonious models. A refinement that implies forgoing this assumption is typically a sacrifice of 
parsimony in  an  effort  to  increase  realism or  predictive  power.  Much of  the  controversy is  in 
deciding what weight should be given to realism as opposed to parsimony in an economic model, 
and this  depends on the problem at hand. Section 3.3.  proposes a  probabilistic  framework that 
allows researchers to balance parsimony against realism by incorporating any amount of cognitive 
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biases into their model, and that includes the utility maximization model as a special case.
3.2. Existing Models of Sub-Optimal Behaviour
Several  attempts  have  been made to  model  sub-optimal  behaviour,  some more  successful  than 
others. One early example is Simon (1955) who argues that the utility maximization model requires 
too much from the agent for it to be accurate. He points out that any organism is unlikely to have 
perfect information or the cognitive ability required to perfectly evaluate the utility of all feasible 
bundles. He especially focuses on the difficulty of an agent to consider and evaluate all elements in 
a  budget  set  containing  many  bundles.  Instead,  he  proposes  that  the  agent  uses  heuristics  or 
simplifications to choose the best bundle that she can only from the subset of bundles that she 
considers.  The  chosen  bundle  is  then  not  necessarily  the  most  preferred  bundle  but  rather  a 
sufficiently good bundle from the agent's perspective.
Tversky (1972) propose and find some empirical support for a model where the agent sequentially 
compares bundles in terms of one aspect at a time and eliminates bundles according to some criteria 
for every iteration until only one bundle remains. Kahneman & Tversky (1979) develop prospect 
theory,  in  which  preferences  and choices  depend  on  potential  losses  and  gains  compared  to  a 
reference point, rather than the final outcome alone as in the utility maximization model. Thanks to 
its  predictive  powers  and generality,  prospect  theory  is  probably  the  most  influential  model  in 
microeconomics that is inconsistent with standard theory.
Smith & Walker (1993) argue that an agent must weigh the benefits of making good choices against 
the cost of making good choices. The time and effort of deliberating is an opportunity cost to the 
agent, because that time could be spent doing something more lucrative or enjoyable. Their review 
of  experimental  studies  reveals  that  agents  deviate  more  from optimal  choices  when  pay-offs 
increase or opportunity costs decrease, suggesting that the trade-off described by Smith & Walker 
contributes to deviations from utility maximization. 
Walker & Ben-Akiva (2002) propose a general model where utility depends not only on preferences 
and a budget constraint but also a random parameter with unknown distribution, making utility 
random. The random nature of utility can then explain how odd behaviour is consistent with utility 
maximization. Tsang (2008) on the other hand sees deviations from utility maximization as being 
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caused by limited computational power, so rather than having a random utility function, the agent 
fails to maximize deterministically determined utility due to shortcomings in cognitive ability.
Other  examples  of  models  intended  to  account  for  behaviour  that  seems  to  violate  the  utility 
maximization model are provided by Marley (1968,1982), McFadden (1980), Machina (1985) and 
Gigerenzer & Goldstein (1996). Related discussions of such models are offered by Loewenstein & 
Lerner  (2003),  Rieskamp  et  al  (2006)  and  Weirich  (2008).  A more  in  depth  summary  and 
comparison  of  the  merits  and  weaknesses  of  these  models,  albeit  interesting,  is  a  project  too 
ambitious to be covered in this text.
The studies mentioned here is by no means an exhaustive list and considering how many models 
have  been  suggested  during  the  last  six  decades,  it  is  likely  that  some  important  models 
unintentionally but still inappropriately have been omitted in this text. In any case, there is clearly a 
justified interest in modelling violations of the utility maximization model. A consensus on the best 
model for utility maximization violations is lacking and none of the models listed here stands out as 
accurate and general enough to form a foundation for a theory that takes flawed decision making 
into consideration.
Thaler  (1980)  points  out  that  prospect  theory  is  particularly  popular,  much  thanks  to  it  being 
applicable  to  many different  kinds  of  decision  problems.  List  (2004) finds  that  when prospect 
theory is applicable, experience of agents correlates positively to the predictive power of standard 
theory and negatively to prospect theory, indicating that agents can learn to reduce the violations of 
utility maximization that prospect theory represents. Prospect theory fails however, to explain and 
predict outcomes in other contexts. For example, it offers no explanation for an agent's choice being 
affected by an irrelevant numerical value due to an anchoring effect (e.g. Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974).
Smith  & Walker  (1993)  clarifies  that  empirical  evidence  suggests  that  their  model  of  effortful 
deliberation  incurring  an  opportunity  cost  only  explains  a  part  of  deviations  from  the  utility 
maximizing choice. Ariely et al (2009) even finds that performance in cognitive tasks declines when 
incentives are excessive. It is then clear that the Smith & Walker model by itself is insufficient to 
explain deviations from utility maximizing behaviour.
The generalized random utility model suggested by Walker & Ben-Akiva (2002) fails to specify the 
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causes for deviations from utility maximization and therefore lacks predictive power, but it enables 
the combining of models into a common framework. Machina (1985:576) criticizes random utility 
models for being unclear on how a random element is realised and to what extent one realised error 
might depend on an earlier realised error. Even if a clarification is provided, the generalized random 
utility model is unintuitive because it fails to recognize flaws in decision making. It maintains the 
view that all choices are optimal, even in the face of phenomena such as the framing effect, the 
anchoring  effect  and  the  reduction  in  the  susceptibility  to  error  that  comes  with  experience. 
Nevertheless,  a  generalized  random  utility  model  is  a  promising  approach  because  it  has  the 
potential to explain all choices of an economic agent and to combine several models into a single 
fairly simple framework.
Fudenberg  (2006)  argues  that  more  general  models  is  exactly  what  is  needed  for  insights  in 
behavioural economics to be widely accepted and integrated into standard economics. He suggests 
that the specific assumptions of the many models in behavioural economics should be reduced to a 
few core  assumptions  that  form a more general  foundation,  and names prospect  theory  among 
others as an example to be emulated. McFadden (1999) acknowledge not only the flaws but also the 
merits of the utility maximization model and argues that a hybrid between standard theory and 
behavioural economics is an appropriate approach. The framework presented in the next section 
addresses the need for a theoretical foundation compatible with both behavioural economics and the 
standard theory of utility maximization.
3.3. Introducing A General Framework
As in the utility maximization model, assume that the binary preference relation ≿  defined on the 
consumption set X  is complete, reflexive, transitive and continuous. The arguments for and against 
these  assumptions  are  the  same  as  those  outlined  in  sections  2.2  -  2.4.  Preferences  are  then 
guaranteed  to  be  represented  by  a  utility  function  u : X→ℝ  such  that   x≿ y ⇔ u(x )≥u( y )  
∀ x , y∈X ,  and  the  optimal  choice  is  given  by  C(≿ , B)  =  { x∈B : x≿ y  ∀ y∈B}  =  
{ x∈B :u(x )≥u( y)  ∀ y∈B} . However, rather than assuming that the agent always makes an 
optimal choice as in the utility maximization model, allow actual choice to deviate from optimal 
choice due to some flaw in the agent's decision making process.
Let an additional argument  γ  represent all the reasons that actual choice deviates from optimal 
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choice, which can be called quirks, anomalies, cognitive biases or errors. If the agent's choice is 
affected by exactly  J  quirks,  γ  can be defined as a vector  γ =(γ1 , ... , γJ )  where  γ j  is the 
effect of quirk  j  on the utility that results from the decision in question, expressed on the real 
number scale. An actual choice set  C(≿ ,B , γ)  then depends on preferences, budget constraints 
and as of yet unspecified quirks that may cause an agent's behaviour to deviate from C(≿ , B) .
Seeing that the utility function is ordinal, γ  must be scaled to correspond to any one of the utility 
functions that represent preferences. This choice of utility function is arbitrary and implies no loss 
of generality. Regardless of which utility function is used, the agent's actual choice can be seen as 
the  set  of  chosen  bundles  after  having  accounted  for  the  effect  of  J  quirks  so  that  for  any 
x ∈C (≿ , B , γ)  and y ∈ C(≿ ,B) , we have u(x )  =  u( y ) + Σ j=1
J γ j . Equivalently, the set of 
chosen  bundles  after  considering  mistakes  can  be  defined  as  C(≿ , B , γ)  =  
{ x∈B : u (x) = u( y )+Σ j=1
J γ j  ∀ y∈C (≿ , B)} . Note that γ j ≤ 0  ∀γ j∈γ  holds by definition 
and that this implies Σ j=1
J γ j ≤ 0  and  u(x )≤ u ( y) . Perfect utility maximization then is the special 
case where Σ j=1
J γ j = 0 .
This  definition implicitly  states  that  situations  in  which an agent's  quirks  causes  her  to  choose 
bundles that are infeasible never occur. Imposing a restriction saying that  γ  is defined such that 
C(≿ , B , γ)⊆ B  is then necessary to avoid situations in which C(≿ ,B , γ)=∅ . If this restriction 
was not imposed, a disturbing consequence would have to be addressed. By definition, only bundles 
in B  can be chosen, so allowing agents to mistakenly choose bundles that are not in B  would be 
absurd. Therefore, when quirks cause an agent to choose or try to choose a bundle that is not in B , 
an empty choice set would mathematically be the result, but applied in the real world this would be 
little more than admitting a failure to understand the causes of choice.
The distinction between the sets  C(≿ ,B)  and  C(≿ ,B , γ)  is so far little more than a formal 
acknowledgement  of  the  cognitive  biases  for  which  evidence  is  mounting  in  behavioural 
economics. It allows researchers to begin with the utility maximization model as a reasonable first  
approximation and then adjust for relevant quirks depending on the problem at hand. Within this 
framework, realism typically increases while parsimony decreases, as the number of quirks taken 
into account increases. It is a synthesis of classical microeconomics and behavioural economics in 
the sense that models from both schools can be incorporated into the framework.
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An  increasingly  large  body  of  empirical  evidence  and  models  accounting  for  many  different 
cognitive  biases  suggests  that  it  is  reasonable,  and  perhaps  even  necessary,  to  see  γ  as  an 
expression for many intricately interrelated quirks. The specification and organisation of quirks and 
their interactions is an important and huge research project that is beyond the scope of this text. The 
emphasis  here  is  rather  on  the  possibility  and usefulness  of  specifying  quirks  and connections 
between quirks within a clear general framework.
If all the components of γ  fully explains choice, there is nothing random about it. However, when 
formulating models in practice it is more feasible for researchers to pick and define the components 
of γ  as they deem appropriate. It is likely that no model accounts for all of an agent's quirks and if  
relevant quirks are omitted, choice should be seen as a random outcome. The deterministic nature of 
the utility maximization choice rule C(⋅)  then does not easily translate to a the realistic framework 
that this text aims to describe.  C(⋅)  produces a subset of B , but something more is required to 
represent the stochastic nature of actual decision making.
One way of formally expressing a probabilistic choice mechanism is to define  C̄(≿ ,B , γ)  as a 
vector with every component p(x i)  representing the probability of the agent choosing bundle x i , 
where the index  i  runs from  1  to  I  in a budget set consisting of  ∣B∣= I  mutually exclusive 
bundles. The framework can then be summarized as
C̄(≿ ,B , γ)= [ p (x1) , p (x2) ,... , p(xI )] .
This expression says that the probability of an agent choosing a bundle from the set of all feasible 
bundles  is  somewhere  between  zero  and  one,  depending  on  preferences,  cognitive  biases  and 
chance.
Actual choice deviates systematically from optimal choice if Σ j=1
J γ j < 0  and it deviates randomly 
from optimal choice if relevant quirks are omitted from γ . Thus, unless there is a way to make 
sure that all relevant quirks are included in γ  and that Σ j=1
J γ j = 0 , actual choice is guaranteed to 
deviate from optimal choice. The utility maximization model is the special case in which the agent 
is not affected by systematic quirks or random whims. The probability of a bundle being chosen 
would then be strictly positive if and only if that bundle maximizes utility.
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This  framework is  so general  that  it  is  consistent  with almost  any decision  model.  Exceptions 
include models relaxing completeness, transitivity or continuity of preferences. For example, Ok 
(2002) propose a vector valued utility function to account for incomplete preferences,  which is 
inconsistent  with  the  real  valued  utility  function  that  the  suggested  framework  here  implies. 
Random utility models such as the one by Walker & Ben-Akiva (2002) are inconsistent with a 
framework  in  which  a  stable  utility  function  representing  preferences  is  guaranteed  by 
completeness, reflexivity, transitivity and continuity.
Furthermore, seeing that γ  can explain any decision or combination of decisions, the framework is 
consistent with any empirical evidence. What appears to be a violation of completeness, transitivity 
or  continuity  can  instead  be  explained  by  flaws  in  the  agent's  decision  making  process.  For 
example, when an agent chooses x  over y , y  over z  and z  over x  a researcher can conclude 
that the agent makes at least one decision that fails to maximize utility, due to flawed heuristics 
represented by γ , or random whims. The framework being consistent with any empirical evidence 
is a weakness more than a strength because it implies the impossibility of testing the truthfulness of  
it. In any case, the framework has little value in isolation but is rather intended as a stepping stone 
towards improved models, or as an extension of existing models.
The suggested approach is applicable to individual agents whose ultimate goal it is to maximize 
utility. It may or may not be possible to generalize the framework further. The preferences of a 
group of  people  might  not  be  complete  or  transitive  even if  all  individuals  in  the  group have 
complete and transitive preferences, so a utility function does not necessarily exist for groups of 
people. The difficulty of aggregating preferences is worth considering not only for consumers but 
also for firms.
In many situations of uncertainty it is reasonable to view the agent as maximizing expected utility 
rather than utility,  but the framework is not readily applicable to the maximization of expected 
utility  without  first  addressing  some important  issues.  With  expected  utility,  every  bundle  is  a 
lottery with a probability assigned to every outcome in that lottery. The expected utility of a lottery 
is a weighted average of the utility of all possible outcomes in that lottery.
Neumann  &  Morgenstern  (1944)  propose  that  expected  utility  is  weighted  according  to  the 
objective probabilities of outcomes, which is now the predominating view in economics. Savage 
(1954) instead proposes that expected utility is weighted according to the agent's perception of the 
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probabilities of outcomes, which is an approach that is now known as subjective expected utility. 
Before applying the suggested framework to expected utility, we must clarify whether the agent 
maximizes objective expected utility, subjective expected utility or some other weighted average.
Furthermore, expected utility theory typically assumes independence in addition to completeness, 
reflexivity,  transitivity  and  continuity,  i.e.  that  for  any  x , y , z ∈ X  with  x≿ y ,  we  have 
α x+(1−α)z  ≿  α y+(1−α) z  ∀α∈( 0,1 ] .  The  independence  assumption  is  particularly 
controversial because of ubiquitous empirical evidence contradicting it. The interested reader can 
find a more in depth review of expected utility theory and related empirical research in Schoemaker 
(1982).  Machina  (1982)  suggests  that  expected  utility  theory  is  possible  with  assumptions  less 
restrictive than independence. In any case, guaranteeing an expected utility function requires more 
than what is required to guarantee a utility function. 
Firms are  typically  seen as  maximizing profit  in  standard microeconomics,  but  such a  view is 
unlikely  to  fully  reflect  the  complex  reality.  In  many  cases,  firms  intentionally  and  explicitly 
consider goals other than monetary gains,  such as promoting a clean environment or economic 
equality. Introducing uncertainty, it is not clear whether firms should maximize expected profit or 
the expected utility that the beneficiaries of the firm gain from it. Lin et al (1974) finds that the 
maximization  of  expected  utility  predicts  agricultural  firms'  decisions  better  than  profit 
maximization.
Even if a firm stipulates profit maximization as its sole ambition, the agents that make up the firm 
may have conflicting goals, implying some ambiguity on what the firm is actually optimizing. For 
example,  an  employee  typically  has  an  incentive  to  increase  her  salary  at  the  expense  of  her 
employer's profit, so decisions made by that employee on behalf of the employer may well act to 
reduce the employer's profit. Berle & Gardiner (1932) argue that profit maximization becomes less 
plausible when directors on salaries exercise more control over a firm than its many small and less 
influential share owners, which is common for many large modern corporations.
The suggested framework is relevant only for problems where an agent optimizes a function and 
mistakes representable by γ  can be quantified on the same dimension. If a function exists and an 
agent's or institution's only objective is to maximize it, a framework analogous to the suggested one 
can easily be imagined. The problem is that it is often not clear what decision makers optimize, if 
anything.  The  idea  that  actual  choice  deviates  from  optimal  choice  due  to  decision  makers' 
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imperfections is tenable for many decision problems other than utility maximization, but if there is 
no function defined on the real number scale to optimize, the suggested approach fails to describe 
economic decisions.
3.4. Stochastic Supply-Demand Schedule
The application of the framework presented in section 3.3. on the supply-demand schedule shows 
that it leads to tangible and useful conclusions. This section demonstrates how the supply-demand 
schedule can be enriched by seeing it in the light of the suggested framework. The demand function 
is one of the most important applications of the utility maximization model. It answers how much of 
a good an agent chooses to consume, given prices and the agent's wealth. While the consumption set 
X  can be any set of consumable bundles in general, the demand function is applicable only for a 
good that is consumed in quantities defined on the real number scale. The demand function also 
requires that each quantity of the good in question has a real-valued price assigned to it and that the 
agent has a real-valued wealth to spend on goods in X .
The conventional way of constructing a demand function begins with assuming  X=ℝ+
L  so that 
every x∈X  is interpreted as a bundle of L  goods, with every good l∈L  being consumed in an 
infinitely divisible quantity  x l ≥ 0 . The next step is to assume that every good l∈L  has a price 
pl > 0  per unit so that nothing is entirely free in infinite amounts and the cost of consuming x l  is 
pl xl . Now let x=(x1 , ... , xL)  be a quantity vector for all goods in X  and let p=( p1 , ... , pL)  be 
the  price  vector  for  those  goods.  The  total  cost  of  any  bundle  x∈X  then  is  the  dot  product 
p⋅x = Σl=1
L p l xl .  The agent cannot spend any more than a finite wealth w≥0 , so his budget set is 
B={x∈X :0≤p⋅x≤w} , which is often referred to as a Walrasian budget set.
Assuming strictly convex preferences in addition to the outlined market structure guarantees the 
existence of a demand function giving a unique utility maximizing bundle for every price vector p
and  wealth  w  (find  proof  in  appendix  A).  Strictly  convex  preferences  means  that  the  set 
{x∈X : x≿x '}  is strictly convex for any  x '∈X , which implies diminishing marginal utility in 
every good l∈L . 
A Walrasian budget set and strictly convex preferences are reasonable assumptions in many typical 
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decision problems in economics  but  are  by no means always true.   If  either  the budget  set  or 
preferences are not convex, a demand function cannot be guaranteed. A volume discount for a good 
l  with a marginal price that is lower for high levels of x l  than for low levels of x l  for example, 
would give a non-convex budget set. Strictly convex preferences are violated if for example either a 
glass of milk or a glass of orange juice is preferred to a mixture of the two, and this seems plausible. 
This  caveat  is  as  valid  in  the  standard  utility  maximization  model  as  it  is  in  a  framework 
acknowledging human errors in decision making. 
If an agent attempts but fails to maximize utility, the quantity actually demanded will differ from the 
quantity that is optimally demanded. Using the notation from section 3.3, if Σ j=1
J γ j < 0  or if factors 
affecting choice are excluded from γ , then actual demand generally differs from optimal demand. 
However,  this  notation  is  unnecessarily  complex  here  because,  by  the  definition  of  demand, 
deviations  from an  optimal  choice  can  be  expressed  on  a  real  number  scale  representing  the 
consumed quantity of a good.
A convenient way of expressing demand and errors in demand is to let an asterisk denote optimality 
so  that  if  an  agent  optimally  demands  x l*( p , w)  units  of  a  given good,  the  agent  ultimately 
chooses  to  demand  x l*( p ,w) + εl  units  of  the  good,  where  εl  is  a  random  variable  with 
distribution  εl ~ Dl(μ l ,σ l) ,  still  subject to  p⋅x ∈ [0,w ] .  The random variable  εl  expresses the 
same deviations from optimality as C̄(≿ ,B , γ) , but in a more specific context. 
If  the  mean  μl=0  the  agent's  average  choice  is  utility  maximizing,  and  if  μl≠0  there  is  a 
systematic bias in the agent's decision making. If  μl = 0  and the standard deviation  σl=0  the 
agent is a perfect utility maximizer, but if either μ≠0  or σl>0  the agent's decisions are generally 
flawed. This description differs from the standard demand function only in that a random element 
representing the agent's mistakes is formally included. This may initially seem like an innocent 
stance, but turns out to have important implications.
Having introduced a random element to the individual's demand function, the next natural step is to 
consider  a  market  demand function  representing the  aggregated  demand of  several  individuals. 
Suppose that each consumer demands x lm*( p ,wm) + εlm  where the index m  represents the m 'th  
consumer  in  a  set  of  M  consumers.  Preferences,  wealth  and  error  terms  may  vary  but  all 
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consumers face the same prices p . There is now one error term εlm~ Dlm(μlm ,σlm)  for each good 
and consumer so that the error distribution of one individual may differ from the error distribution 
of another individual. It is also possible that the error distribution of one consumer depends on the 
error distribution of other consumers.
The  market  demand  function  for  a  group  of  utility  maximizers  is  d l* ( p ,(w1 , ... ,wM))  =  
Σm=1
M x lm* ( p ,wm)  and  the  stochastic  version  of  market  demand  subsequently  is  d l  =  
Σm=1
M x lm* ( p ,wm)  +  εlm .  If εlm  is an i.i.d. variable, d l  is approximately normally distributed for 
a  group of  many people  by the  central  limit  theorem, and the standard deviation of  the  mean 
σl /√M  decreases as  M  increases,  meaning that  d l  approaches  Σm=1M x lm* ( p ,wm)+μm  as  M  
approaches infinity.
Inconveniently,  empirical  evidence  suggests  that  errors  are  not  identical  or  independent  across 
agents (Moulton 1986). Rather, individuals tend to emulate others' behaviour even when it makes 
no sense, leading to conformity in markets and otherwise (Asch 1951, Bikhchandani & Sharma 
2000, Hong et al 2004). Thus,  εlm  being an i.i.d. variable is a dubious assumption, and the error 
distribution of the market demand function can take many forms other than a normal distribution. 
Strictly  speaking,  a  normally  distributed  error  term is  impossible  because  it  spreads  out  from 
negative infinity to positive infinity while a decision only can be made in the finite interval [0, w] . 
A normal error distribution can be a reasonable approximation when the mean of the error is at least  
a few standard deviations from the limits of the budget set, but an optimal decision typically entails 
exhausting the budget.
If for any bundle x∈X , there is always a bundle y∈X  close to x  such that y≻x , preferences 
are said to be locally non-satiated. Assuming locally non-satiated preferences is enough to imply 
that all wealth is optimally spent (Mas-Colell 1995:52). Remember from section 3.3. that  γ  and 
C̄(≿ ,B , γ)  are defined so that only bundles in an agent's budget set can be chosen. If the utility  
maximizing  bundle  is  on  the  upper  limit  of  a  consumer's  budget  set,  any  mistake  that  entails 
spending more than the given wealth cannot be realised.
Equivalently, if the consumer optimally spends all wealth, she can only make mistakes such that 
Σl=1
L pl εl ≤ 0 .  If wealth is allocated between several different goods, an overconsumption of one 
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good may be financed by an underconsumption of another good, so σlm > 0  does not necessarily 
imply μlm < 0 . Nevertheless, deviations from a utility maximizing bundle on the upper bound of a 
budget set can only lead to an inefficiently low total consumption.
Next, a supply function is introduced. In spite of the reservations expressed in section 3.3, assume 
that firms are sub-optimal profit maximizers. Like consumers, firms can be thought of as having 
quirks representable by a vector like γ . Unless all of the quirks are perfectly specified, firms also 
appear to make random choices on the quantity they should supply to maximize profit, given prices. 
Firms  may  well  face  restrictions  on  how  much  they  produce,  similar  to  how  consumers  are 
constrained  by  a  budget  set,  which  then  limit  the  quantity  they  can  supply.  However,  it  is 
conventional to assume that firms can produce any amount they see fit to maximize profit.
A single firm's supply function is q l*( pl)= argmaxx l pl⋅x l−c (xl)  where c (x l)  is the firm's cost of 
selling  x l  units of good  l . Using the same reasoning as with the demand function, consider a 
market with several sub-optimal firms. Market supply then is sl = Σn=1
N argmaxx ln pl⋅x ln−c (x ln)+εln  
where n  refers to the n ' th  firm in a set of N  firms and εln ~ Dln(μln ,σ ln) . 
Consumers reasonably prefer more to less of a good when demand exceeds supply, given constant 
prices and wealth. Similarly, firms want to increase trade of the same good when supply exceeds 
demand. That is, consumers buy as much of good l  as they can when  sl < dl , and firms sell as 
much of good l  as they can when d l < sl . Thus, for any market size and any degree of proneness 
to  error,  the  quantity  traded  given  prices  p  is  min {sl , d l} ,  or  min{ s l*( p l)+εls ,  
d l* ( p ,(w1 , ... ,wM))+εld } ,  where  the  notation  εls = Σn=1
N εln  ~ Dls(μls ,σ ls)  and  εld = Σm=1
M εlm  
~ Dld (μld ,σld)  is used to distinguish between market supply errors and market demand errors. 
The exact distribution of the market clearing quantity min {sl , dl}  can be derived directly from the 
distributions  of  sl  and  d l .  The  expected  value  of  min {sl , dl}  is  invariably  lower  than  any 
weighted average of  sl  and  d l , so the minimum of supply and demand being traded acts as an 
inhibitor of trade at all levels of prices and wealth. This implies that the average quantity produced 
and consumed on a free market is lower than what is socially optimal even when all market agents 
individually make optimal decisions on average.
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Consider especially a market where there are no transaction costs and prices are given such that an 
equilibrium quantity  sl* (p l) = d l *( p ,w1 , ..., w I )  results. Suppose that both firms and consumers 
make sub-optimal decisions but maximize profits and utility on average, so that  μls ,μld = 0  and 
σls ,σld > 0 . We can then expect the actual quantity produced and consumed to be lower than the 
equilibrium quantity  predicted  by standard microeconomic  theory.  If  errors  are  i.i.d,  this  effect 
becomes smaller as the size of a market increases.
3.5. Simulations of Stochastic Supply and Demand
A demand curve as it is conventionally drawn on a two-dimensional plane is not satisfactory as an 
illustration of demand that accounts for the random imperfections of consumers. First, considering 
any given price, the probability of an agent demanding a range of quantities can be illustrated using 
a probability density function. Putting a continuous interval of prices together will  then form a 
surface  in  a  three  dimensional  space  illustrating  demand  with  errors.  If  errors  are  normally 
distributed, the probability distribution function will be bell shaped (illustration 2) and the surface 
consisting of a continuum of probability density functions for all prices will be a ridge (illustration 
3).
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Illustration 2: Probability density function of demand with  
d l* = 100  and Σm=1
M εlm ~ N (0,12)
Similarly, if firms are allowed to deviate from their profit maximizing choice, a supply curve on a 
two-dimensional plane is not a satisfactory illustration of the random nature of firms' supply. A 
probability density function can illustrate the probability that a range of quantities is supplied, given 
a price (illustration 4). Displaying all prices together in a three dimensional graph gives a surface 
illustrating stochastic supply for a continuum of prices (illustration 5).
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Illustration 4:  Probability density function of supply with 
sl* = 100 , Σn=1
N εln ~ N (0,12)
Illustration 3: The demand ridge gives the probability that a quantity will be demanded for a given 
price. Any price can be seen as giving a probability density function, or visually a slice of the ridge, 
which by definition has an area equal to one.
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Illustration 5: The supply ridge gives the probability that a quantity will be supplied for a given 
price. Any price can be seen as giving a probability density function, or visually a slice of the ridge, 
which by definition has an area equal to one.
Illustration  6:  Probability  density  functions  of  demand  with  d l* = 100 , 
Σm=1
M εlm ~ N (0,12) ,  supply  with   sl* = 102 ,  Σn=1
N εln ~ N (0,12)  and  the  resulting 
minimum of demand and supply, or market clearing quantity.
For any given prices, there is a probability density function for demand and another for supply. The 
probability density function of the minimum of the two random variables  sl  and  d l  serves to 
illustrate the probability that a good is traded over a range of quantities given constant prices.
Illustration  6  shows a  simulation  of  probability  density  functions  of  demand with  d l* = 100 , 
Σm=1
M εlm ~ N (0,12) , supply with  s l* = 102 ,  Σn=1
N εln ~ N (0,12)  and the resulting minimum of 
demand and supply, for a given price. Demand and supply have almost overlapping distributions, 
but the distribution of the market clearing quantity min { sl , d l}  is significantly different from the 
distributions  of  both  demand  and  supply.  Specifically,  the  distribution  of  the  market  clearing 
quantity has a lower mean and lower variance than both demand and supply.
36
Illustration  7:  Probability  density  functions  of  demand  with  d l* = 90 , 
Σm=1
M εlm ~ N (0,12) ,  supply  with   sl* = 102 ,  Σn=1
N εln ~ N (0,12)  and  the  resulting  
minimum of demand and supply, or market clearing quantity.
Illustration  7  shows  a  simulation  of  probability  density  functions  of  demand  with  d l* = 90 , 
Σm=1
M εlm ~ N (0,12) , supply with  s l* = 102 ,  Σn=1
N εln ~ N (0,12)  and the resulting minimum of 
demand and supply. The distribution of the market clearing quantity approaches the distribution that 
has  the  lower  expected  value  as  the  absolute  difference  between expected  demand and supply 
increases.
Finally,  illustration  8  shows  a  simulation  of  probability  density  functions  of  demand  with 
d l* = 90 ,  Σm=1
M εlm ~ N (0,18) ,  supply  with   s l* = 102 ,  Σn=1
N εln ~ N (0,9)  and  the  resulting 
minimum of  demand  and  supply.  In  this  simulation,  both  the  distribution  of  demand  and  the 
distribution of supply are symmetrical, but the graph clearly shows that the resulting distribution of 
the  market  clearing quantity  is  heavily skewed,  with  its  left  tail  closely  following the demand 
distribution.
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Illustration  8:  Probability  density  functions  of  demand  with  d l* = 90 , 
Σm=1
M εlm ~ N (0,18) ,  supply  with   sl* = 102 ,  Σn=1
N εln ~ N (0,9)  and the  resulting  
minimum of demand and supply, or market clearing quantity.
4. Conclusion
This text reviews the utility maximization model and the assumptions on which it  relies. Some 
evidence suggests that these assumptions may not  hold,  meaning that  the existence of a utility 
function reasonably can be questioned. Yet more evidence suggests that if a utility function does 
exist,  agents  often  fail  to  maximize  it.  A general  framework  accounting  for  agents'  failure  to 
optimize preferences is suggested. As in the utility maximization model, preferences are assumed to 
be  complete,  reflexive,  transitive  and  continuous,  which  guarantees  the  existence  of  a  utility 
function  representing  preferences.  The possibility  of  violations  of  these  assumptions  cannot  be 
denied, but is disregarded in the suggested framework, partly because what appears to be violations 
can  be  explained  as  mistakes  within  the  suggested  framework,  and  partly  because  of  the 
fundamental importance of the utility function that follows from the assumptions.
Empirical evidence is consistent with agents striving towards but failing to maximize utility, and 
deviations from utility maximization cannot be characterized as measurement errors alone. Rather, 
economists are justified in acknowledging that economic decisions often are flawed, i.e. that agents' 
actual  choices  often  deviates  from  their  utility  maximizing  choices.  Some  existing  models 
accounting for sub-optimal choices are discussed, but none of them is accurate and general enough 
to serve as a theoretical foundation for both classical microeconomics and behavioural economics.
The suggested framework asserts that there is a utility maximizing bundle in a compact budget set  
and that the agent strives towards choosing such a bundle. Deviations from the optimal choice are 
described as being caused by a vector  γ = (γ1 , ... , γJ )  with each component quantifying how 
much a quirk  j  reduces  utility.  When quirks affecting deviations  from the optimal  choice are 
omitted  from  γ ,  choice  is  probabilistic  rather  than  deterministic,  so  the  framework assigns  a 
probability  of  choice  to  every  bundle  in  the  budget  set.  This  generalisation  of  the  utility 
maximization model allows researchers to start with the standard utility maximization model and 
adjust predictions to account for flaws that cause agents' choices to deviate from the optimal bundle.
The suggested framework clarifies how the utility maximization model can be tweaked to account 
for flaws in decision making. This sets the stage for a holistic view of sub-optimal behaviour, but 
extensive research is needed to quantify how the many quirks of economic agents are interrelated. A 
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better understanding of how cognitive biases for which evidence is mounting are connected, might 
allow for a synthesis of many models in behavioural economics which are currently applicable only 
to specific situations.
Next,  the implications of the general framework on the supply-demand schedule are examined. 
First, the framework implies that deviations in demand is asymmetrical because the agent typically 
spends her entire budget on the optimal bundle, so deviations from optimal demand cannot entail 
spending too much money.  Exacerbating this  tendency of consumers to  underspend rather  than 
overspending, the interaction between sub-optimal consumers and sub-optimal firms is shown to 
inhibit  trade.  Expected  trade  is  inefficiently  low when consumers  and firms  make mistakes  in 
general but make optimal choices on average, even without transaction costs and with prices that 
produces  an  efficient  equilibrium in  the  standard  model.  Merely  allowing  for  deviations  from 
optimal choice implies that the quantity produced and consumed on a free market is lower than 
what is socially optimal.
Many big and important  questions  remain unanswered.  Is  an analogous framework tenable  for 
expected utility and for firms? Do some agents' error distribution differ from others' in systematic 
ways?  How  does  sub-optimal  choices  affect  outcomes  when  prices  are  chosen  by  firms  or 
negotiated between buyers and sellers? Does the shape of consumers' error distributions matter to a 
firm that sets price? How can the large variety of cognitive biases be simplified into a parsimonious 
but still general model? Is there a better framework than the suggested one?
Adding an error distribution dimension to choice theory requires increasingly complex analysis and 
more  computational  power,  and  it  is  not  clear  how  further  research  on  this  path  will  benefit 
economics or science at large. Researchers finding it worthwhile examining error distributions and 
their  implications  on  economics  in  closer  detail  might  find  increasingly  powerful  computers  a 
useful or even necessary tool. For now, using fairly simple mathematics, this paper demonstrates 
that  acknowledging  the  mistakes  of  economic  agents  has  important  implications  in  economic 
theory. Acknowledging deviations from optimal choices is not as trivial or innocent a stance as it 
superficially may appear.
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Appendix A – Proof of the Existence of a 
Demand Function
Proposition: If  B  is compact and convex, and  ≿  is complete, reflexive, transitive, continuous 
and strictly convex, then a demand function exists.
Proof: The existence of a utility function representing preferences is guaranteed by completeness, 
reflexivity,  transitivity  and  continuity.  A demand  correspondence  gives  the  set  of  bundles  that 
maximizes  utility  given a  budget  set  defined by prices and wealth,  or formally  x*( p ,w)  =  
argmaxx∈B ( p ,w)u(x) . The demand correspondence is a demand function iff  ∃! x∈x* ( p , w)  for 
every p  and w . Thus, all that is required to prove the existence of a demand function is to show 
that there is a unique utility maximizing bundle x  for all prices and wealth levels.
Note first that the Walrasian budget set B={x∈X :0≤p⋅x≤w}  is compact. B  is closed because it 
contains  all  of  its  own  limit  points,  or  equivalently  because  its  complement 
{x∈X : p⋅x<0∨ w< p⋅x}  is an open set.  B  is bounded from below by the assumption that all 
quantities are non-negative, and bounded from above by the assumption that no more than a finite 
wealth can be spent on goods with strictly positive prices.  Thus, B  is closed and bounded, or in 
other words compact.
Knowing  that  B  is  compact,  the  extreme  value  theorem  establishes  that  the  agent's  utility 
maximization problem max x u(x)  subject to x∈B  implies ∃x∈B :  u(x) ≥ u(x ')  ∀ x ' ∈ B , 
i.e.  that  the agent  always can  choose a  utility  maximizing bundle  in  B .  Thus  x*( p ,w)≠∅ , 
establishing the existence of a demand correspondence.
To guarantee that the demand correspondence is a demand function, we begin by showing that B  is 
convex. Consider any x , x '∈B  and define x ''=α x + (1−α)x '  with α∈[0,1] . By the definition 
of  B , the cost of x  is  0 ≤ p⋅x ≤ w  and the cost of x '  is  0 ≤ p⋅x ' ≤ w . The cost of  x ''  is 
p⋅x ' '  =  p⋅[α x + (1−α)x ' ]  =  α p⋅x + (1−α) p⋅x '  and we conclude that 0 ≤  α p⋅x  +  
(1−α) p⋅x '  ≤ w  ∀α∈[0,1]  or simply 0 ≤ p⋅x ' '≤ w , implying that x ''∈B . The established 
result x , x '∈B  ⇒  α x + (1−α) x ' ∈ B  ∀α∈[0,1]  is the definition of convexity.
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Next, assume strictly convex preferences, meaning that for any  x , x '∈X  with  x≠x '  we have 
α x+(1−α)x '≻ x ,x '  ∀α∈[0,1] . In terms of a utility function, for any x , x '∈X  with x≠x '  
we have u(α x+(1−α)x ')  >  u(x) = u(x ')  ∀α∈[0,1] .
Now consider any  x , x ' ∈ x*( p , w)  with  x≠x '  and define  x ''  =  α x + (1−α) x ' . Seeing 
that  x*( p ,w)⊆B ,  the  convexity  of  B  implies  x ''∈B .  By  the  definition  of  the  demand 
correspondence we have u(x)=u (x ')  and by the definition of strictly convex preferences we have 
u(x ' ')  >  u(x)  =  u(x ') . But the existence of an x ''∈B  giving strictly higher utility than x  
and  x '  contradicts  x , x ' ∈ x*( p ,w) . Thus there can only be one bundle in  x*( p ,w)  so that 
∃! x∈x* ( p , w)  for every p  and w , establishing the existence of a demand function.
∎
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